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Introduction 
North Korea is without any doubt one of the most mysterious countries in the world. The country 
is so closed that hardly anything is known about the situation inside. Only the stories of the few 
refugees from the country give some idea about the real life in North Korea. The political views 
and goals of the regime in Pyongyang are subject of intense speculation. Although in western 
media sometimes a somewhat lunatic, Cold War style regime is pictured[1]—mainly due to the 
often indeed hilarious propaganda from Pyongyang—the regime is in fact very capable of playing 
the game of international politics.  
Few countries with the same economic stature would ever be able to act this strong toward the 
world’s most powerful states, let alone that they would gain as much from diplomatic negotiations 
like the Six Party Talks. What is the background of this North Korean strength? What are the aims 
of the regime in Pyongyang with its nuclear program, and what could these aims mean for the 
near future? Did North Korea really end its nuclear activities?  
Insecurity and the Myth of Self-Reliance 
To understand the background of the North Korean nuclear policy to at least some extent, it is 
necessary to look into the ideology of the regime that has shaped the (political) culture in North 
Korea since the establishment of the state in the 1940s. The essence of the so-called Juche 
ideology is often summarized as “self-determination” or “self-reliance.”[2] After a long history of 
suppression by the neighboring states China and Japan, North Korea’s main goal is complete 
independence in all respects. All policy of the North Korean regime is based upon this ideology, 
but two policy areas are especially important to understand North Korea’s behavior with regard to 
its nuclear program: foreign policy and economy. 
First of all, the foreign policy of North Korea can be described by the terms “fear” and “distrust”—
some would even use the word “paranoid.” The strong belief in Juche ideology is that other states 
will never accept a completely independent North Korea; every (regional) power will always try to 
influence and to make use of the North Korean people, just the way it happened in the past. After 
the Chinese and Japanese rulers, now the United States is considered the main threat: after 
arriving on the Korean peninsula during the Second World War, the Americans never left and 
made half of the Korean nation (read: South Korea) a “vassal state” where troops and weapons 
are stationed to conquer the independent North as soon as they see a possibility. These ideas 
are the source of North Korea’s aim to become a military superpower; military strength is 
considered necessary to guarantee self-determination. Next to its large conventional forces—
North Korea has the largest army in the world when one considers the military as a percentage of 
the population—acquiring weapons of mass destruction has always received a lot of attention. 
North Korea possesses large amounts of chemical and biological weapons, and the nuclear 
program is just another step in “self-defense,” as North Korea calls it. Nuclear weapons are seen 
as necessary to deter all (possible) enemies that are nuclear powers themselves.[3] 
In the field of economic policy, the self-reliance of the Juche ideology is also important. A 
remarkable fact is that economic self-reliance is almost impossible in North Korea, as was 
already acknowledged in the first years of the North Korean state: “To be sure, North Korea is by 
no means self-sufficient and its maintenance of even a semi-modern economy depends upon its 
ability to import a great many types of goods... It is apparent that if the North Korean economy is 
obliged to conform to strict conditions of self-help, the standard of living in the area will be at very 
low level for a long time to come.”[4] This prediction in 1950 proved right. The agricultural 
circumstances in North Korea are quite unfavorable, while the country does not possess much 
raw materials either. That the North Korean economy survived for some sixty years already was 
only possible because economic self-reliance was not taken too seriously. During the Cold War, 
the North Korean regime proved very skilled in playing the communist rivals China and the Soviet 
Union off against each other, receiving extensive economic support from both. When the Cold 
War ended, however, the assistance from the Soviet Union also ended, resulting in a major (and 
still ongoing) economic crisis in North Korea. Famine became a recurring catastrophe for its 
population; estimates of famine victims during the past fifteen years vary between some hundreds 
of thousands to several million. Although North Korea still receives economic support from China, 
and to a lesser extent from Russia and South Korea, the country has a structural lack of almost 
anything, especially food and energy. Rather than pursuing economic reforms, the North Korean 
regime seems to prefer to rely on foreign aid, the same way the regime survived during the last 
six decades. This “aid-seeking policy” is an important part of the explanation of North Korea’s 
nuclear program and the way the regime deals with the international negotiations on this subject. 
Viewed economically, the nuclear program has a blackmail function to extract aid from other 
states. Pyongyang wants to be paid for every step it takes, even for coming to the negotiation 
table at all.[5]  
Aims and Strategies 
Roughly said, the aims of the North Korean nuclear program can be summarized as follows. 
Above all, nuclear weapons offer security. Nuclear deterrence towards supposed enemies is the 
most important goal. Next to that, there is the economic goal of using the nuclear program as an 
instrument for blackmailing to extract foreign aid. In exchange for North Korean concessions on 
this program, a lot of concessions from the other side of the negotiating table are being claimed. 
A third aim that should be mentioned, although it is partly overlapping with the first two aims, is 
that North Korea wants to be taken seriously, to be dealt with like a state that matters. This is one 
of the reasons why North Korea always urges the United States to engage in unilateral talks; the 
world’s biggest superpower has to recognize that North Korea is an equal partner. 
These non-security aims make the North Korean case particularly special when compared to 
other states with nuclear weapons programs. Normally, these states try to develop their nuclear 
weapons in secret to prevent any external interference. The North Korean regime, on the contrary, 
openly acknowledges its endeavors to become a nuclear weapons state—some observers 
characterize the North Korean behavior as “atomic exhibitionism.”[6] By showing how dangerous 
North Korea is, the regime expects to extract more concessions from the international community. 
In the meantime, the North Korean leadership takes into account that military intervention is not 
very likely. There is no unity among its opponents. The United States seems to be the only state 
eventually willing to intervene militarily, but they will not do that without the consent of their most 
important partners in the region, South Korea and Japan. Those states are afraid of North Korean 
violence to their own territories and will refuse any support for military action—especially as the 
South Korean capital, Seoul, is very close to the border and might be destroyed in the first hours 
of a war because North Korea considers the South as a vassal state of the United States. China 
and Russia, in turn, are not at all in favor of U.S. involvement in their area of influence—which 
North Korea is at least to some extent. An even more important reason to oppose military action, 
shared by all parties involved, is the fear of the chaos that will arise when the regime in 
Pyongyang collapses. Because of a lack of political opposition in North Korea, a collapsing 
regime will not be easily replaced by new leaders in the short term, so anarchy and chaos will 
spread through the country—and beyond its borders. The neighboring states China, Russia and 
South Korea fear large flows of hungry refugees, as well as the spread of weapons (including 
weapons of mass destruction).[7] Chaos and instability in North Korea may influence the whole 
region in a negative sense and the costs of stabilization and development of the ruined country 
will be enormous.[8] North Korea not only recognizes these international fears, but also makes 
use of them, playing the “instability card” at the negotiation table to attract more concessions from 
its counterparts.[9] 
Next to the strategy of playing the instability card, the North Korean regime uses the strategy of 
constantly slowing down all negotiation processes. Every possible detail is used to delay the 
negotiation processes as a whole. One example of many is the Banco Delta Asia affair. When in 
2005 the North Korean accounts at this bank in Macau were declared “infected” by the United 
States and consequently frozen, North Korea refused to negotiate any further about anything as 
long as this relatively small problem was not resolved.[10] That time is on the North Korean side 
seems to be the idea in Pyongyang. As long as negotiations are possible, military action against 
the regime is highly unlikely, while at the same time the nuclear program may continue, at least to 
some extent. And as long as negotiations are dragging along, aid requirements due to floods and 
other disasters—that sometimes seem to be exaggerated to extract more support—will be taken 
more seriously by the international community. After all, nobody wants to see the regime in 
Pyongyang collapsing because of popular unrest as long as there could be nuclear devices 
available in the chaos that will arise, so food and energy supplies will surely follow upon these 
kind of aid requests.  
North Korea at the Six Party Talks 
The international negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program take place at the Six Party 
Talks, in which North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan are 
present at the negotiation table. Even the very existence of the Six Party Talks as a negotiation 
framework is already a success for North Korea. From the North Korean point of view, there are 
no friends and there is only one important enemy: the United States. Negotiating within 
international organizations like the United Nations is not favorable for Pyongyang, because North 
Korea will be completely outnumbered by non-friendly parties at the negotiation table (even the 
seemingly pro-Pyongyang states China and Russia are distrusted in Pyongyang; the idea is that 
their assistance is mainly meant to make North Korea their vassal state). Preferably, North Korea 
would negotiate directly with the United States, without any other parties involved. The United 
States, however, formally refused to talk bilaterally so far. Shifting the negotiations from the 
United Nations to the Six Party Talks is an important improvement for North Korea. Instead of 
being one of 192 parties, North Korea became one of six parties involved. From the North Korean 
perspective, being one of the Six Parties is a recognition that it is equal to the negotiating 
partners, and thus one of the great (regional) powers. It should be noted that initially Russia was 
not supposed to be involved in the talks. North Korea insisted on Russian participation to balance 
the pro-U.S. and contra-U.S. countries better (considering Japan and South Korea supporting 
Washington, and China and Russia supporting Pyongyang). 
As explained above, the North Korean strategy at the Six Party Talks can be described as follows: 
making the negotiations as slow as possible, not only by causing problems about as many details 
as possible, but also by making the negotiations as complicated as possible. This is why 
Pyongyang does not want to negotiate about the nuclear program as an isolated subject, but also 
wants to include other themes, like relations with South Korea and the US, energy deals, and so 
on. The Japanese insistence on including the abduction case in the negotiations, in this sense 
favors the North Korean strategy, making the negotiations even more diffuse. By making the 
negotiation process as complicated as possible, it is easier to sabotage parts of it. The other 
parties would more easily end the negotiations when North Korea would not fulfill the only point of 
agreement then when North Korea could say, “we did not manage to fulfill this promise, but we 
are doing a good job on the other ones.” 
Although the North Korean negotiation strategy at the Six Party Talks is sometimes simply 
earmarked as rude and unwilling by western media, it is important to acknowledge that the 
sometimes indeed rude and seemingly unwilling behavior is not meant to completely end the 
negotiations. On the contrary, North Korea has nothing to gain by ending the international 
negotiations. The non-cooperative behavior that North Korean diplomats often show at the Six 
Party Talks is only meant to slow down the negotiations, not to let them fail completely. From the 
North Korean perspective, the negotiations should preferably go on forever. By the strategy of 
slowing down the negotiations as much as possible, the regime in Pyongyang is winning time and 
maneuverability—the risk of military action against the regime is limited as long as negotiations 
are ongoing, while in the meantime incidental economic support can be acquired.  
Prospects for the Near Future 
Considering the North Korean aims with its nuclear weapons program, one may question the 
willingness of Pyongyang to fulfill all promises it made within the 13 February 2007 Action Plan. 
From the viewpoint of the North Korean regime, it seems to have the most profit of continuing the 
negotiation process as long as possible, rather then to end it in whatever way, be it by solving the 
issue of its nuclear program or by breaking away from the negotiations at all.[11] Although the 
agreement of February 2007 led to an atmosphere of optimism in the international community, 
especially after handing over the required documents about the nuclear activities in June 2008, 
one should remember that previous agreements, especially the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 
2005 Joint Statement, failed after some time, due to so-called “differing interpretations” or even 
obvious cheating from the North Korean side. It is difficult to predict how the North Korean 
behavior towards the agreement will develop this time. The closing of five nuclear sites in July 
2007 seems very promising in this respect, as well as the assumed openness about its nuclear 
activities that North Korea recently gave by handing over an impressive amount of documents—
whether the information is correct and complete has yet to be verified. 
Some observers, however, can simply not believe that the North Korean regime would ever 
completely surrender its nuclear weapons program, because it is Pyongyang’s only real leverage 
with the international community.[12] They may have a point there. But in spite of the image of 
the North Korean regime in the western press, Pyongyang is not irrational at all, but very capable 
in playing the game of international diplomacy. When the North Korean leadership made the 
calculation that dismantling the nuclear program is the most profitable action at this moment, it 
may be serious. The outcome of these kinds of North Korean calculations are unfortunately not 
known outside a select group of people in Pyongyang. The North Korean strategy with regard to 
its nuclear program will therefore remain somewhat mysterious, now and in the near future. One 
lesson, however, may be learned from the past: don’t trust the North Korean regime too easily. 
The leaders in Pyongyang are masterminds in international politics.  
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